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WHAT THE SUPREME COURT COULD LEARN ABOUT THE
CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT BY READING PLAYBOY
Due to the ease of Internet searching, Congress has passed the Child Online
Protection Act to protect children from sexually explicit material. Although the
Supreme Court has not directly decided the issue, it has hinted that the Act may
survive a First Amendment challenge. In this Note, the author argues reasons why
the Act should not survive a First Amendment challenge, and that measures such
as parental empowerment via government-facilitated use of Internet filtering
software are preferable.
INTRODUCTION
The exponential growth of the Internet in size and popularity has revolutionized
the way the world and Americans, in particular, do business, access information,
and entertain themselves. Testifying to the pervasiveness of Internet use in
American life is the fact that by 2001, 50.5% of American homes were connected
to the Internet,' and 53.9% of the nation's population were Internet users.2
Like other media of communication, the Internet provides access to materials
which are not suitable for all potential audience members. Specifically, sexually
explicit material abounds on the World Wide Web,3 and much of that material is
unsuitable for consumption by the minors who constitute a very substantial portion
of Internet users.4 This concern has caught the attention of the U.S. Congress,
BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 1136, HOUSEHOLD WITH
COMPUTERS & INTERNET ACCESS: 1998 & 2001 (2002) [hereinafter HOUSEHOLD WrrH
COMPUTERS], at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs /02statab/ infocom.pdf.
2 BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 1134, COMPUTERS &
INTERNET USE BY INDIVIDUALS: 1997 & 2001 (2002), at http:llwww.census.gov/prod/
2003pubs/02statab/ infocom.pdf.
3 See Am. Library Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,419 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
("[T]he absolute number of Web sites offering free sexually explicit material is extremely
large, approximately 100,000 sites."), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003). Also, a large number
of commercial websites offer pornographic content for a monetary fee. See ACLU v. Reno,
217 F.3d 162, 167 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing the fact that the Child Online Protection
Act only applies to those offering pornographic content for commercial purposes), vacated
by 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
4 According to census data, 27.9% of children between the ages of three and eight and
68.6% of children between the ages of nine and seventeen use the Internet. HOUSEHOLD
WrrH COMPUTERS, supra note 1.
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which has acted quickly to pass legislation aimed at protecting children from
exposure to harmful materials online.-
The road to unconstitutionality is often paved with good intentions, though, and
Congress's first attempt to remedy the problem, the Communications Decency Act
(CDA),6 immediately fell prey to the strictures of the First Amendment.7 As for
Congress's second effort, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA),8 a Pennsylvania
district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the Act
before it even took effect,9 suggesting that COPA's future was destined to be as
bleak as that of its predecessor. In 2002, though, the Supreme Court had its first
encounter with COPA when the government asked the Court to overturn the
preliminary injunction barring enforcement of COPA. " Though the Court did not
go so far as to overturn the injunction, as will be discussed later, the Court's
decision and accompanying opinions hinted that COPA would have a fighting
chance were the Court in a position to directly evaluate the facial constitutionality
of the Act under the First Amendment."
This Note strives to highlight and discuss reasons why the Supreme Court
should not give COPA a First Amendment green light. Reflecting upon the Court's
words in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 2 a case involving
legislation aimed at protecting children from pornographic materials on cable
television, this Note will suggest that parental empowerment via government-
facilitated use of Internet filtering software is an equally efficacious, less restrictive
means of accomplishing the goal of childproofing the Net, rendering a regime as
invasive as that proposed by COPA invalid under the First Amendment.
Additionally, this Note argues that the Court's strong tradition of recognizing a
parent's substantive due process right to raise his or her child as he or she sees fit
militates against COPA and in favor of less invasive legislation geared toward
parental empowerment.
First, this Note will provide an overview of the structures and judicial
treatments of the CDA and COPA, as well as a brief exploration of the
constitutional standards that guide a court when examining legislation akin to the
5 Communications Decency Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. § 223 (2002) (held unconstitutional
by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)); Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231
(2002) (held unconstitutional by ACLU v. Asheroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003)).
6 47 U.S.C. § 223.
7 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 844.
8 47 U.S.C. § 231.
9 See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473,498-99 (E.D. Pa. 1999), affd, 217 F.3d 162
(2000), vacated by 535 U.S. 564 remanded to 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003).
'0 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002), petition for cert.filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3130
(U.S. Aug. 11, 2003) (No. 03-218).
" See infra pp. 254-55.
12 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
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CDA and COPA. Finally, this Note will examine the Playboy opinion and discuss
the relevance that case has to the issues of Internet regulation and the
constitutionality of COPA.
I. CDA
The drafters of the Communication Decency Act (CDA) sought to combat child
access to Internet pornography through two separate provisions. The creators of the
Act first provided a general telecommunications provision, reading as follows:
Whoever... by means of a telecommunication device knowingly...
makes, creates, or solicits, and initiates the transmission of, any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the
communication is under 18 years of age... shall be fined under title 18,
United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 3
The drafters also provided a more computer-specific provision, which forbade
the use of a computer to expose a child to "patently offensive" materials:
Whoever in interstate or foreign communications knowingly... uses an
interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons
under 18 years of age, or uses any interactive computer service to
display in a manner available to person under 18 years of age, any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
activities or organs ... or knowingly permits any telecommunications
facility under such person's control to be used for [such an activity] with
the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under title 18,
United States Codes, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. ' 4
President Clinton signed the CDA into law on February 8, 1996,"5 but just one
week later, a Pennsylvania district court entered a temporary restraining order
barring enforcement of the Act in response to a suit brought by the American Civil
Liberties Union and a number of other organizations.16 A preliminary injunction
'3 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (emphasis added).
"4 Id. § 223(d) (emphasis added).
'5 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
16 See id. at 827.
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quickly followed." Thirteen months after being signed into law, the CDA came
before the Supreme Court, which ultimately ruled the Act unconstitutional under
the First Amendment.i"
In support of its affirmation of the lower court's decision, the Court cited
several First Amendment concerns, including a concern that the CDA could
potentially hinder a constitutionally unacceptable volume of speech. 9 As the Court
pointed out, the CDA differed from past statutes with similar goals but aimed at
different media in that no effort had been made to limit the CDA to commercial
speech, contributing to its gaping scope.20
Additionally, the Court discussed the fact that Congress, by using the phrase
"interactive computer service,"'" had drafted the computer-specific portion of the
CDA in a manner that made it applicable to all the various modalities of Internet
communication, including e-mail, newsgroups, mail exploders, chat rooms, and the
World Wide Web. 22 Each of these modalities of Internet communication functions
differently and presents its own challenges when trying to draft relevant
constitutionally sound legislation. 3 The Court seemed troubled by Congress's
attempt to deal with pornography on each modality with one broad, sweeping
statutory regime that did not accommodate the differences among them.
24
Finally, the Court's overbreadth concerns about the CDA were exacerbated by
the presence of the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive, 25 the meanings and
scopes of which the Court found not to have been specified by the Act.26 The Court
17 See id. at 883-84.
is See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
'9 See id. at 870-75.
21 Id. at 877 ("Unlike regulations upheld in [the past], the scope of the CDA is not limited
to commercial speech or commercial entities.").
21 See 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (2002).
22 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 855-56.
23 See id.
24 The Court expressed this concern with the following words:
The problem of age verification differs for different uses of the Internet.... The
Government offered no evidence that there was a reliable way to screen
recipients and participants [using e-mail, newsgroups, and mail exploders] for
age. Moreover, even if it were technologically feasible to block minors' access
to newsgroups and chat rooms containing discussions of art, politics, or other
subjects that potentially elicit "indecent" or "patently offensive" contributions,
it would not be possible to block their access to that material and "still allow
them access to the remaining content, even if the overwhelming majority of that
content was not indecent."
Id. (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
z See 47 U.S.C. § 223 amended by 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)(1)(B), (d)(1) (2003).
26 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 871-74 & n.37 ("The general, undefined terms 'indecent' and
'patently offensive' cover large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious
educational or other value.").
(Vol. 12:243
THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT
also expressed concern that the Act's implementation would "curtail a significant
amount of adult communication on the Internet," which was not a goal of the
CDA.2
The Court theorized that fear of punishment under the CDA, coupled with the
high cost of compliance,2" would discourage certain types of communication,
despite the fact that the communications themselves, when made from one
consenting adult to another, would not be illegal under the CDA - a state of affairs
which, according to the Court, would ultimately lead to a dangerously diminished
level of protected adult speech on the Internet. 9 In short, the Supreme Court sent
Congress an unequivocal invitation to revisit the drawing board.30
II. COPA
Undaunted by the Court's judicial rebuff of the CDA, Congress expediently
passed a replacement - the Child Online Protection Act (COPA).3 l Congress
encapsulated the conduct forbidden by COPA with the following words: "Whoever
knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or
foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any communication for
commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material
that is harmful to minors.... ,32 As it had done with the CDA, Congress offered
affirmative defenses (i.e., suggested methods of compliance) within the text of
COPA, including "requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code,
27 See id. at 876-77 (emphasis added).
28 The CDA did enumerate a list of defenses to prosecution, which might also be termed
"suggested methods of compliance." These suggested methods of compliance included a
showing that the accused violator "has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and
appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors" to an
illegal communication or a showing that the alleged violator has "restricted access... by
requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal
identification number." 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5) (2002). The Supreme Court was unimpressed
by the presence of these defenses, however, agreeing with the district court that "it would be
prohibitively expensive for noncommercial - as well as some commercial - speakers who
have websites to verify that their users are adults." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 876-77.
29 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 876-77.
o The Supreme Court's decision explicitly left intact the authority to prohibit and punish
the use of telecommunication devices to expose minors to materials found to be obscene
under § 223(a)(1)(B). Id. at 864. The First Amendment does not protect obscene speech. See
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) ("But implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. This
rejection for that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity should be
restrained .... ).
"' Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2002).
32 Id. (emphasis added).
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or adult personal identification number" or taking "any other reasonable measures
that are feasible under available technology."33 A reading of COPA in conjunction
with the Supreme Court's opinion from Reno v. ACLU reveals an effort on the part
of Congress to remedy the concerns that led to the demise of the CDA.34
First, in an apparent effort to hem in the amount of speech encompassed by the
Act and thereby alleviate the overbreadth concerns that had proven deleterious to
CDA, Congress implanted two important qualifications into COPA: COPA only
applied to communications made "by means of the World Wide Web;" and only
governed communications made for "commercial purposes."35 The distinguishing
characteristics did not stop there, though: in an attempt to avoid the judicial
criticisms prompted by the use of the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" in
the CDA, Congress used a new phrase, "harmful to minors," 36 and augmented that
phrase with a definition37 tracing its pedigree all the way to the front door of the
Supreme Court. Congress defined the phrase using the exact language delivered by
the Supreme Court itself in an earlier indecency case - Miller v. California.3"
Despite these congressional efforts to prevent COPA from going the way of the
CDA, COPA encountered constitutional turbulence before it even went into effect.
Just as it had done to the CDA, a Pennsylvania district court entered a temporary
restraining order barring enforcement of COPA pursuant to a suit brought by many
of the same plaintiffs who had opposed the CDA,39 including the ACLU.4" A
33 id.
4 See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 174 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[Iln passing COPA, Congress
attempted to resolve all of the problems raised by the Supreme Court in striking down the
CDA as unconstitutional.").
" See 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1).
36 id.
17 The term "material that is harmful to minors" means any communication,
picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of
any kind that is obscene or that the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with
respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the
prurient interest; depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive
with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an
actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the
genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.
Id. § 231(e)(6).
3 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (using the exact language used by COPA to define "material
that is harmful to minors" in defining the term "obscene" in a criminal case involving
distribution of allegedly obscene materials via mail).
'9 See ACLU v. Reno, No. 98-5591, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18546 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23,
1998). In addition to the ACLU, that list of plaintiffs included Androgyny Books, Inc., Artnet
Worldwide Corp., Free Speech Media, Internet Content Coalition, OBGYN.NET,
Philadelphia Gay News, Powell's Bookstore, Riotgrrl, Salon Internet, Inc., West Stock, Inc.,
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preliminary injunction followed soon after.4 As part of its decision on whether to
issue the preliminary injunction, the district court assessed the plaintiffs' likelihood
of success in a trial on the merits.42 The court decided that the plaintiffs had a
sufficient likelihood of success, partly due to the fact that there were seemingly
other available means of approaching the problem, such as filtering software, that
might prove less restrictive and, at least, equally efficacious when compared to
COPA.43
When the government appealed the district court's decision to grant the
preliminary injunction, the Third Circuit affirmed, but it hinged its reasoning for
doing so on grounds distinct from those relied upon by the district court." Rather
than focus on the question of whether a less restrictive means existed, the court
devoted its attention to Congress's use of the Miller standards for obscenity to
define the phrase "harmful to minors."45 One of the most noteworthy features of the
Miller standards is their reliance on "contemporary community standards., 46 The
Third Circuit postulated that any attempt to apply community standards to an
amorphous medium like the World Wide Web, a medium for which geographic
limits to distribution cannot currently be imposed, would work a violation of the
First Amendment.47 According to the panel, allowing such standards to be applied
would frustrate the constitutional rights of members of more liberal communities,
whose abilities to access certain information to which they have a constitutional
right would be hampered by COPA.48 Individuals offering sexual materials on the
Web for commercial purposes would have to be certain that their websites
comported with the community standards of the most conservative community in
the country in order to avoid running afoul of COPA.49
American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, Blackstripe, Addazi, Inc., Electronic
Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy Information Center.
4o See id. at *15-18.
41 See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473,498-99 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (granting and order
for preliminary injunction).
41 See id. at 492.
41 See id. at 497 ('The record before the Court reveals that blocking or filtering
technology may be at least as successful as COPA would be in restricting minors' access to
harmful material online without imposing the burden on constitutionally protected speech that
COPA imposes on adult users or Web site operators.").





4' See id. at 177.
49 See id.
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WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
COPA' s case found its way to the Supreme Court in 2002 in Ashcroft v. ACLU'
in which the Court passed on the question of whether the court of appeals had erred
in affirming the district court's decision to issue a preliminary injunction. The
Court's inquiry was limited to the sole ground relied upon by the Third Circuit,
namely the "contemporary community standards" issue.5'
The primary argument forwarded by COPA's opponents, which echoed the
opinion of the Third Circuit, but which the Court ultimately found to be
unpersuasive, was that the Internet was distinguishable from other nationwide
media to which the Court had allowed application of community standards, 2
because, unlike the state of affairs surrounding other media, there are currently no
methods of geographically limiting the distribution of materials placed on the
Internet. Consequently, an Internet publisher has no feasible way of avoiding those
communities that mightjudge his communications to be "harmful to minors." 3 The
Court held that the incorporation of "community" decency standards alone, the sole
grounds relied upon by the affirming appellate court, did not render COPA
unconstitutional. The Court, therefore, vacated the Third Circuit's judgment and
remanded the case for consideration of other issues.54 The Court did not lift the
-0 535 U.S. 564 (2002), remanded to 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003).
51 See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
52 See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1989)
(upholding the application of community standards for obscenity when interpreting a federal
statute regulating obscene telephone communications made by "dial-a-porn" call-in
businesses); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103-10 (1974) (upholding the
application of a community standard for obscenity when interpreting a federal statute
forbidding the mailing of materials found to be obscene).
"3 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 581-83.
54 See id. at 585-86 ("The scope of our decision today is quite limited. We hold only that
COPA's reliance on community standards to identify 'material that is harmful to minors'
does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First
Amendment.").
One should hesitate to view the Court's reversal as an outright validation of the
application of "contemporary community standards" to Web content because of the variety
of specific responses exhibited by the Court.
Three justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Scalia, did explicitly
reject the plaintiffs' principal argument and the Third Circuit's reasoning, saying that
controllability of a medium's reach has never served as a controlling factor in prior precedent
and that it therefore should not be a controlling factor where the Internet is concerned. Id at
582-84.
These three members of the Court further explained that unsure Internet publishers do
have a method of controlling the communities exposed to their communications; namely, they
can pick a medium more controllable than the Internet. See id. at 583. This particular stance
is somewhat troubling and questionable considering the following words from the Court's
Reno v. ACLU opinion, which was joined by both Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia: "[Olne
is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place." See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880
[Vol. 12:243
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injunction banning enforcement of COPA, however, explaining that such action
would have to wait because issues yet to be addressed by the appellate court
remained in the case.
In March 2003, the Third Circuit delivered its response to the Supreme Court
by reaffirming the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction barring
enforcement of COPA.56 This time, the Third Circuit left no stone unturned,
holding that COPA is not narrowly tailored,57 that other means exist that are both
(1997) (quoting Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (reversing
two convictions under ordinances banning the distribution of handbills without a permit)).
Resting on the other extreme was Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, who entirely
disagreed with the reasoning of Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, and who found more merit
in the arguments of the plaintiffs and the Third Circuit. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at
605-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The stances of the remaining five justices were not as clear. Justice O'Connor concurred
in the decision to reverse and remand as well as in a portion of the main opinion. Unlike her
colleagues, however, she suggested that the applicability of "community standards" to
Internet content was not a settled issue and that, if presented in certain situations, specifically
in the form of an as-applied challenge, she might be inclined to provide a different response.
See id. at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In an as-applied challenge, for instance,
individual litigants may still dispute that the standards of a community more restrictive than
theirs should apply to them. And in future facial challenges to regulation of obscenity on the
Internet, litigants may make a more convincing case for substantial overbreadth.").
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg took a different position on the subject,
concurring in the judgment but saying that the question of whether "community standards"
could constitutionally be applied to Internet speech was inseparable from the other issues
implicated by COPA and that, therefore, the question was unanswerable on the record before
them, necessitating a reversal and a remand of the case. See id. at 591-602 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("We cannot know whether variation in community standards renders the Act
substantially overbroad without first assessing the extent of the speech covered and the
variations in community standards with respect to that speech.").
Finally, Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment and in part of the main opinion,
assumed his own unique stance, explaining away the First Amendment issue by stating his
belief that Congress was referencing "the Nation's adult community taken as a whole" when
using the term "community standards" in COPA. See id. at 589-91 (Breyer, J., concurring).
For an examination of the question of whether "community standards" may be applied
to Internet communications under the First Amendment and an analysis of alternative
solutions, see William D. Deane, Comment, COPA and Community Standards on the
Internet: Should the People of Maine and Mississippi Dictate the Obscenity Standard in Las
Vegas and New York?, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 245, 283-99 (2001).
5 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 586.
56 See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003) ("We hold that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, nor did it err in ruling that
the plaintiffs had a probability of prevailing on the merits of their claim inasmuch as COPA
cannot survive strict scrutiny.").
" Id. at 248-53 (pointing both to the language of the statute, particularly the phrase
"harmful to minors," and to the undefined term "commercial purpose," as well as the limited
2003]
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less restrictive and equally capable of meeting the government's interest in
protecting children,58 and that COPA suffers from overbreadth in that it threatens
a constitutionally unacceptable quantity of otherwise protected speech.59
What comes next for COPA? The likely answer to that question is another
appeal to the Supreme Court by the Department of Justice, seeking invalidation of
the preliminary injunction that currently bars enforcement of COPA.6'
Reading Between the Lines - How Does the Supreme Court Really Feel About
COPA?
The Court's opinion in Ashcroft v. ACLU is an interesting and somewhat
perplexing read for one hoping to discern the Court's true opinion of COPA (i.e.,
how it would rule if the question of the overall facial validity of COPA under the
First Amendment were squarely before it). In its convoluted multi-part opinion, the
Court sent conflicting messages on this question. On the one hand, the Court
clearly stated the limited scope of its decision in Ashcroft v. ACLU, constantly
reiterating that its ruling was limited to the specific question of whether
incorporation of the Miller standards into COPA alone rendered the Act facially
invalid.6" On the other hand, though, the Court's decision eroded a major route of
affirmative defenses offered by the statute as factors contributing to a finding that COPA is
not sufficiently narrowly tailored).
58 Id. at 253-57 (discussing use of filtering software as a less restrictive but equally
effective alternative to COPA) (citing various portions of United States v. Playboy Entm't
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000)).
'9 See id. at 257-59 (explaining that COPA endangers many protected pieces of speech
with its language, again, particularly focusing on the "harmful to minors" and "commercial
purposes" language, as well as the limited affirmative defenses offered by the statute, all of
which, according to the court, generate an unconstitutional "chilling" effect on speech that
is otherwise protected by the First Amendment).
'0 If congressional supporters of COPA had their way, COPA would fight the judiciary
to its last breath, as evidenced by the statement of COPA's drafters, Rep. Michael G. Oxley
(R-OH), co-sponsor, Rep. James C. Greenwood (R-PA), and the Chairman of the House
Commerce Committee, Thomas J. Bliley (R-VA), upon learning of the district court's
decision to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the Act: "We continue in our steadfast
support of the COPA, and we urge the Department of Justice to continue defending this law
at trial or on appeal all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court." Heather L. Miller, Note, Strike
Two: An Analysis of the Child Online Protection Act's Constitutional Failures, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 155, 167 & n.97 (1999) (quoting John Schwartz, Judge Halts Law to Keep
Children from Web Porn, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 2, 1999, at 7A).
On August 11, 2003, John Ashcroft expressed the unwavering support of the Department
of Justice for COPA, filing a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. See
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S.
Aug. 11, 2003) (No. 03-218).
61 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 585 ("We do not express any view as to whether
[Vol. 12:243
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facial attack open to COPA opponents during a trial on the merits, namely an attack
focusing on the inclusion of "contemporary community standards," which arguably
made success for COPA proponents during a trial on the merits at least more likely
than before. Further, in a portion of the opinion explicitly joined by four justices,
the Court paid COPA lip service for evidencing an improvement over its
predecessor, the CDA, saying, "COPA, by contrast, does not appear to suffer from
the same flaw because it applies to significantly less material than did the
CDA.. . ."62 Those four justices were particularly impressed by the presence of
"prurient interest '63 and "serious value '64 prongs, both integral components of the
Miller community standards, as limitations on the scope of COPA. 6' Finally, the
three justices who chose only to join in the Court's judgment suggested that any
facial challenge to COPA must be handled with extreme care due to the fact that
individuals who had witnessed the striking down of the CDA had also drafted and
signed COPA into law, meaning the Court should presume that these legislators
drafted and passed COPA with the intent of avoiding the pitfalls of the CDA.66
Thus, the question of whether a majority of the Supreme Court sees COPA as
friend or foe remains open and will remain so at least until the Supreme Court is
given another opportunity to pass on the question of whether the preliminary
injunction issued against COPA was erroneous. It does seem, though, as if the
Court in Ashcroft v. ACLU was hinting that COPA stands a chance of surviving
strict scrutiny when the issue next appears before the Court.
COPA suffers from substantial overbreadth for other reasons, whether the statute is
unconstitutionally vague, or whether the District Court correctly concluded that the statute
likely will not survive strict scrutiny .... ).
62 Id. at 578 (Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., concurring).
63 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(6) (2002). For the exact statutory language, see supra note 37.
64 Id.
6' See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 580-81 ("When the scope of an obscenity statute's
coverage is sufficiently narrowed by a 'serious value' prong and a 'prurient interest' prong,
we have held that requiring a speaker disseminating material to a national audience to
observe varying community standards does not violate the First Amendment.") (citing
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103-10 (1974) (upholding the application of a
community standard for obscenity when interpreting a federal statute forbidding the mailing
of materials found to be obscene)).
66 See id. at 591-92 (Ginsburg, J., Kennedy, J., and Souter, J., concurring) ("Congress
and the President were aware of our decision, and we should assume that in seeking to
comply with it they have given careful consideration to the constitutionality of the new
enactment.... [T]he Judiciary must proceed with caution and identify overbreadth with care
before invalidating the Act.").
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lIH. SUGGESTIONS TO THE COURT - WHY COPA SHOULD BE SENT THE WAY OF
THE CDA
When the Supreme Court next meets COPA, it should declare the Act
unconstitutional on two separate grounds. First and foremost, COPA does not
represent the least restrictive means of meeting the government's compelling
interest in controlling child exposure to Internet pornography, making the Act
intolerable to the First Amendment. The Court's recent decision in the Playboy
case67 supports this argument, as does the Third Circuit's citing of the availability
of other less restrictive means as one of several reasons for again affirming the
district court's preliminary injunction against COPA.6 s Second, the Court has long
recognized a parent's substantive due process right to raise his or her children as he
or she sees fit, with certain limitations.69 The existence of this right and the
importance of safeguarding it weigh against adoption of an invasive regime of
regulation such as that embodied by COPA. Before either of these arguments may
be properly presented, a brief exploration of prior First Amendment jurisprudence
and principles and of the way courts have applied those principles to COPA thus far
is in order.
A. When is the First Amendment Implicated?
The most obvious types of government activity implicating the First
Amendment are government actions that specifically forbid communication of a
certain type or manner on the basis of content,70 or government actions that relegate
certain types of communications to particular "time[s], place[s] and manner[s],"
regardless of the content of the involved speech.71 One less obvious but equally
67 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
s See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003).
69 See discussion infra Part VI.
70 For examples of such content-based regulations, see 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2002)
(forbidding the mailing of, among other things, "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy
or vile" materials) and 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (2002) (forbidding, among other things, the use
of a telecommunications device for commercial purposes to make an "obscene
communication").
7" See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-21 (1972) (upholding as a
valid restriction on the time, place, and manner of speech, a city ordinance prohibiting
activities near a school that are or would be disturbing to the "peace or good order" of the
school, regardless of the content of the involved speech); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569, 574-76 (1941) (upholding a state statute requiring the obtaining of a license in order
to stage a parade on public streets, where the relevant licensing board was found to not be
vested with the sort of "unfettered discretion" that would allow it to make decisions based
upon the content of the speech shared by those applying for a license).
The question of whether a government action or regulation rightfully falls into the "time,
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implicating set of circumstances arises when a government statute burdens
communications of a certain content type with required fees, onerous regulations,
threats of punishment for failure to comply with guidelines, etc., to the point of
discouraging the making of such communications at all, even where constitutionally
protected, and possibly to the point of discouraging nontargeted but similar speech.
The Court has described such content-based government action as having a
"chilling" effect on speech." The judiciary has placed the CDA and COPA in this
latter category of First Amendment implication.73
place, and manner" category, like most questions of constitutional law, can be a slippery one,
especially where matters of indecent communications are concerned. For example, when
dealing with zoning ordinances affecting adult movie houses but not other types of movie
houses, the Supreme Court has on at least two occasions placed the zoning ordinance at bar
in the "time, place, and manner" category, relying on the government's contention that its
interest in passing and enforcing the regulations was not the curbing of movies with adult
content but, rather, was the curbing of the negative "secondary effects" associated with the
presence of such movie houses, such as increased crime rates and decreased property values.
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49-52 (1986) (upholding a city
ordinance that prohibited adult movie theaters from locating within a specified distance from
residential zones); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,70-73 (1976) (upholding
a city ordinance that prevented adult movie theaters from locating near other "regulated uses"
or near residential zones). In other words, the Court held that the distinction among speech
being made was based on effect on crime rate and property value, not speech content.
72 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244- 51 (2002) (striking down,
on First Amendment grounds, a federal law banning images which appear to feature minors
in a pornographic context when, in actuality, no minors were involved in the creation of the
images, due to the "chilling" effect such a prohibition might have on otherwise protected
speech); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 493-96 (1965) (striking down an anti-
communism statute criminalizing failure to register on behalf of those who were members
of what the statute termed "subversive organization[s]," citing concerns for the "chilling"
effect the statute had on protected rights of expression and association).
" See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) ("[T]he CDA... raises special First
Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. The severity of
criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even
arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images."); ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 258-59
(3d Cir. 2003) (agreeing with the district court that Web publishers who attempt to comply
with COPA would likely encounter economic disincentives because requiring publishers to
collect personal information on individual users might discourage Internet users from
accessing the publishers' communications, even adult Web surfers, which would, in turn,
lower the profits of Web publishers of adult materials, discouraging them from publishing
at all), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. Aug. 11, 2003) (No. 03-218); ACLU
v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (discussing COPA, "[A] chilling effect
could result in the censoring of constitutionally protected speech .. "), affid, 217 F.3d 162
(3d Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
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B. Levels of Scrutiny
One of the first questions a court engaging in First Amendment analysis must
answer is the question of which level of scrutiny the court must apply to the statute
or government action in question. The aforementioned categorization based on
whether a suspect statutory regime or government action distinguishes among
speech on the basis of content or on the basis of the "time, place, and manner" plays
a pivotal role in this threshold inquiry.74 Government action distinguishing on the
basis of content, unlike "time, place, and manner" restrictions,75 invokes the Court's
highest level of scrutiny, strict scrutiny, which requires the government to
demonstrate an interest that is "compelling" coupled with means of serving that
interest that are "narrowly" or "carefully" tailored.76 Regulations distinguishing
communications on the basis of whether the message is "indecent" or "harmful to
minors," like the CDA and COPA, are regulations based on content, so when
defending them against a First Amendment attack, the government must
demonstrate an interest that is "compelling" and means that are "narrowly tailored"
to serve that interest.77 Further, the Supreme Court has already made clear that
courts must apply an unqualified form of strict scrutiny to Internet provisions like
the CDA and COPA.18
74 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867-70 (1997) (deciding whether the CDA
could best be characterized as a content-based restriction on speech or a "time, place, and
manner" restriction before deciding which level of First Amendment scrutiny should be
applied to the CDA).
71 So-called "time, place, and manner" restrictions on speech, however, invoke a lower
level of scrutiny, requiring only that the government demonstrate a "substantial" interest in
taking action and that the government not unreasonably foreclose other routes of making the
same communications. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986)
(examining the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance restricting the location of adult
theaters in relation to residential zones).
76 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 879; Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("It is not enough to show that the Government's ends are
compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends."); Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976) ("If the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its
legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise
of fundamental personal liberties.").
77 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 879. The Supreme Court has directly addressed the
question of whether a statute like the CDA or COPA should be treated as a "time, place, and
manner" restriction on speech. See id. When defending the CDA, the government asserted
that the number of other avenues available for the sorts of information affected by the CDA
rendered the Act a mere restriction on "time, place, and manner." Id. The Court responded
to that argument with the following: "CDA regulates speech on the basis of its content. A
'time, place, and manner' analysis is therefore inapplicable." Id.
78 When passing on questions of sexually explicit materials in certain media in the past,
specifically the broadcast media, the Court has lowered the level of scrutiny applied. See
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FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) ("[O]f all forms of communication,
it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection.").
The Supreme Court has cited several reasons for this diminished level of scrutiny applied
to regulations bearing on the broadcast media. First, the Court has cited the "uniquely
pervasive presence" of the broadcast media in American life, a state of affairs that, according
to the Court, brings the First Amendment rights of the media into direct tension with what has
been described as the "individual's right to be left alone." Id. at 748-49. Additionally, the
Court has justified this diminished level of protection by pointing to the easy access children
of all ages have to the broadcast media. Id. at 749-50. Finally, the Court has also cited the
unique physical limitations of the broadcast media (i.e., the fact that there are a limited
number of frequencies and a theoretically limitless number of would-be broadcasters) as a
justification for the allowance of greater government control and regulation of the broadcast
media, reasoning that the government must be given leeway in order to bridge the gap
between supply and demand in a fair manner. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 388-89 (1969) (involving a challenge to the constitutionality of the FCC's fairness
doctrine rules, which required broadcasters to present both sides of an argument).
However, the Court has distinguished the Internet from broadcast media in this respect,
finding no history of pervasive regulation of the Internet, which is traceable to the fact that
the Internet, unlike traditional broadcast media, is a medium of limitless communication
outlets, and to the fact that the Internet is not as invasive, according to the Court, as
traditional broadcast media. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 868-70. This distinction
between the broadcast media and the Internet has led the Court to extend unqualified First
Amendment protections to Internet communication. See id. at 870 ("[O]ur cases provide no
basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the
Internet].").
For an argument that the Internet is so analogous to broadcast media that courts should
grant Internet communications the same qualified First Amendment protections as those
accorded to broadcast media, see Rebecca L. Covell, Note, Problems with Government
Regulation of the Internet: Adjusting the Court's Level of First Amendment Scrutiny, 42
ARiz. L. REv. 777, 792-93 (2000) (arguing that "mousetrapping" and "pagejacking" scams
that result in the sudden pop-up of sexually explicit materials on the computer screen with
no affirmative steps having been taken by the user to make them appear as well as the easy
accessibility of the Internet to modem children are factors that make the Internet analogous
to the invasive and easily accessible broadcast media, meaning that the Court should grant
Internet publishers the same qualified First Amendment protections as those enjoyed by the
broadcast media).
Also, the Supreme Court has previously qualified the First Amendment rights of
publishers making commercial speech:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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C. The Government's Interest... Compelling?
The government has at least one strong weapon at its disposal: the Supreme
Court has held in the past79 and continues to hold80 that the government has a
compelling interest in protecting children from exposure to obscene and indecent
sexual materials."1 Thus, the constitutionality of most government actions and
legislation aimed at meeting this interest has hinged, and will likely continue to
hinge, on the Court's view of the means chosen by the government to meet its goals
and on the question of whether those means are "carefully tailored.
'8 2
D. Government Interest Meets Tailoring
A sufficiently compelling reason for the government to leap into action is not
equivalent to a license to pass any and all legislation capable of solving the problem
where First Amendment protections are implicated to the highest degree.8 3 After
the government has proposed a solution, there still remains the question of whether
that solution is "carefully" or "narrowly tailored."' In application, this inquiry
often translates into the question of whether there is open to the government an
alternative route of action that is at least equally efficacious in solving the problem
The district court who issued the preliminary injunction barring COPA, however, made
clear that precedent establishing such qualifications were inapplicable to COPA. See ACLU
v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (pointing to the fact that the Supreme Court found no reason
to qualify the First Amendment protection accorded to the speech targeted by the CDA in
Reno v. ACLU).
'9 See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749-50 (recognizing the government's compelling
interest in protecting youth from exposure to indecent materials in a case involving an
allegedly indecent radio broadcast); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968)
(recognizing the New York legislature's power to enact legislation designed to protect
children from "abuse" and upholding legislation prohibiting the sale of obscene materials to
minors as being a legitimate exercise of that power).
0 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 875.
81 It would appear that protection of children from harmful materials represents the only
compelling governmental interest upon which the government may rely in this arena. When
defending the CDA, the government advanced the additional argument that they have an
"[e]qually significant" interest in promoting Internet growth and that regulations, such as
those embodied in the CDA, served to promote that interest. Id. at 885. The Court was less
than receptive to this argument, saying, "[W]e find this argument singularly unpersuasive.
The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas contradicts the factual basis of this
contention." Id.
8 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
8 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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targeted by the action or law but that impinges on First Amendment rights to a
lesser degree.8" If it is the case that an equally efficacious, less restrictive route
remains open to the government, the government may not proceed with its proposed
plan of action without running afoul of the First Amendment. Depending on the
case, the question of narrow tailoring might also be framed as an inquiry as to
whether the statute or government action suffers from overbreadth (i.e., whether the
action or law at issue is overinclusive), unnecessarily affecting more protected
speech than necessary to accomplish the government's compelling goal or goals.8"
When dealing with First Amendment cases involving sexually explicit materials
in the past, the Court has made one thing clear where tailoring is concerned:
Regardless of the strength of the government's interest in protecting children, "[t]he
level of discourse [among adults] cannot be limited to that which would be suitable
for a sandbox."87
Lack of narrow tailoring ultimately proved fatal to the CDA, with the Court
focusing on the overbreadth of the statute.88 The Court did conduct a cursory
exploration into the issue of whether there was an equally efficacious, less
restrictive means available for meeting the government's interest,89 but the Court
apparently found all the ammunition it needed in the text of the statute itself, which,
according to the Court, featured far too few limitations capable of hemming in the
scope of the statute to an acceptable degree.9"
85 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (holding
unconstitutional under the First Amendment a statute requiring operators of adult cable
channels to either implement changes that would alleviate the issue of "signal bleed" of adult
programming altogether, a fairly expensive undertaking, or to limit programming to the hours
of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. due to the availability of a less restrictive, equally efficacious
means); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 369-70 (1976) (holding that patronage dismissals of
government employees violated the First Amendment because they generally were not the
least restrictive means of accomplishing the compelling government ends of encouraging
government efficiency due to the availability of other equally efficacious, less restrictive
means, such as the limitation of such dismissals to policymaking positions only).
86 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121-22
(1991) (holding unconstitutional under the First Amendment a law hindering the ability of
one who has committed a crime to write about the commission of that crime and thereby
make a profit for being overinclusive and, therefore, insufficiently narrowly tailored).
87 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-75 (1983) (striking down a
federal statute forbidding the unsolicited mailing to homes of information on contraception);
see also Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989); Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957) ("We have before us legislation not reasonably
restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal. The incidence of this enactment is to reduce
the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.").
88 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-85 (1997).
89 See id. at 879.
90 See id. at 874-85.
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No court has yet directly (i.e., in a trial on the merits) evaluated the question of
whether COPA is sufficiently narrowly tailored; though, the district court that
enjoined its enforcement did discuss it in the context of deciding whether the
plaintiffs had successfully made the requisite showing of a likelihood of success on
the merits,9 as did the Third Circuit during its second examination of COPA after
remand from the Supreme Court.92 Each of those courts seemed convinced that
COPA was not sufficiently narrowly tailored,93 yet, as has already been discussed,
the Supreme Court on appeal did seem to be impressed by Congress's having
drafted into COPA certain limitations which were nowhere to be found in the ill-
fated CDA.94
This fact is one of utmost importance, for it suggests that the parties opposing
COPA might have to go a step further than they had to go in order to defeat the
CDA if they wish to succeed in persuading the Court that COPA is irreconcilable
with the First Amendment. Indeed, this turn of events suggests that in order to
prevail at the Supreme Court level on the theory that COPA is violative of the First
Amendment, its opponents will now have to press more firmly the question of
whether there exists a less restrictive, equally efficacious means of serving the
government's interest in protecting children.
E. The Least Restrictive Means - COPA 's Last Stand
COPA opponents and the courts handling their claims have already discussed
the question of whether a less restrictive, equally efficacious means of childproofing
the Internet exists.95 Most of these discussions have centered on the topics of
filtering software and of whether parental implementation of such software
represents a less restrictive, equally efficacious solution to the issue at hand.96
", See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d473,496-97 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff'd, 217 F.3d 162
(3d Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
92 See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 250-61 (3d Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed,
72 U.S.L.W. 3130 (Aug. 11, 2003) (No. 03-218).
13 See id. (pointing to both the language of the statute, particularly the phrases "harmful
to minors" and "commercial purpose," as well as the limited affirmative defenses offered by
the statute as factors contributing to a finding that COPA is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored); ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 496-97 (expressing doubt as to the ability of the
government to prove sufficiently narrow tailoring at a trial on the merits).
94 See supra pp. 255.
5 Both the district court in ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497, and the Third Circuit
in ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 261-66, have already passed on this least-restrictive means
argument, and each court has found the argument persuasive, citing it as a reason for ruling
that COPA opponents were likely to succeed in an eventual trial on the merits.
96 See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 261-66 (pointing to filtering/blocking software as
a less restrictive alternative to COPA to support its finding that COPA is not the least
restrictive avenue of government action available); ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
[Vol. 12:243
THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT
However, as the Third Circuit pointed out during its first discussion of COPA, such
parental action is not governmental action aimed at meeting a governmental
interest.97 Indeed, parental use of filtering software represents parental action aimed
at meeting parental interests, regardless of the fact that parental and governmental
interests happen to overlap where children and Internet pornography are
concerned.9 s
Thus, COPA opponents should be careful in framing their arguments and should
avoid simplifying the argument to the point of claiming that potential parental
action alone sufficiently obviates the need for COPA or some other congressional
action. In other words, COPA opponents should avoid cutting the government out
of the equation altogether; instead, they should make an argument that casts the
government and parents as cooperative entities in the fight against child access to
computer pornography. This argument should focus on promulgating legislation
designed to empower both parents and the government to meet their compelling
interests in protecting children from the perils of the Web, either by partnering the
government with filtering software providers or via government programs designed
to educate parents on the importance of limiting the types of materials their children
access on the Net.99 In turn, when COPA opponents properly make such an
argument, the Supreme Court, in light of past precedent, should heed this argument
Evidence was presented that blocking and filtering software is not perfect, in that it is
possible that some appropriate sites for minors will be blocked while inappropriate
sites may slip through the cracks. However, there was also evidence that such software
blocks certain sources of content that COPA does not ....
Id.
9 See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 171 n.16 (3d Cir. 2000) ("We are of the view that
such actions do not constitute government action, and we do not consider this to be a lesser
restrictive means for the government to achieve its compelling interest.").
Interestingly enough, when passing on the COPA issue for the second time, the same
Third Circuit judges who handled the court's first examination of COPA - Senior Circuit
Judge Garth and Circuit Judges Nygaard and McKee - assessed the argument that filtering
and blocking software represented a less restrictive means capable of rendering COPA
unconstitutional. See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 261-66. Despite the court's earlier
statement that parental use of filtering software did not constitute government action (See
ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d at 171 n.16), the court held that filtering and blocking software
programs were a less restrictive means of accomplishing the goals of COPA, and that the
existence of those technologies was a factor mitigating against a finding of First Amendment
compliance for COPA. See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 261-66.
The Third Circuit offered no explanation for this attitude change. Thus, it would be very
prudent of COPA opponents to be mindful of the existence of the argument that the mere
availability of filtering and blocking software alone is not government action in a
constitutional sense, for this argument could very well be a weapon of choice for COPA
proponents as they take their case back to the Supreme Court.
98 See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d at 171 n.16.
9 Suggested legislation will be offered. See infra Part V.
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and, therefore, again send Congress back to the legislative drawing board. One may
find insight on how to successfully make such an argument and on why such an
argument should persuade the Court via an examination of the Court's 2000 opinion
in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.'io
IV. SUBSCRIBING TO PLAYBOY
A. Playboy at a Glance
In an effort to curb instances of children accessing fleeting sexual images in the
form of "signal bleed"'' from imperfectly scrambled adult cable channels,
Congress passed section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.'02
Enforcement of this provision gave adult cable channels a choice between two
courses of action: either fully scramble adult channels for all nonsubscribers - a
prohibitively expensive undertaking - or limit programming to hours when
children are least likely to be watching television, a span of time administratively
set at 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC)." 3 As the Playboy Court pointed out, because of financial realities, most
affected parties chose the latter of these two options, resulting in what the Court
termed "a significant restriction of communication.""
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., and other interested parties challenged the
law on First Amendment grounds, primarily claiming that a less restrictive, equally
efficacious means of remedying the "signal bleed" problem was available in the
form of section 504 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,1'5 which requires cable
television providers to "fully scramble or otherwise fully block" any channel upon
customer request free of charge."°6 Plaintiffs persuaded the Court with this
argument, and as a result, the Court held that section 504, coupled with effective
notice of its existence and function to consumers, was an equally efficacious, less
'00 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
0' The following excerpt from the Playboy opinion defines the term "signal bleed":
"Scrambling could be imprecise, however; and either or both audio and visual portions of the
scrambled programs might be heard or seen, a phenomenon known as 'signal bleed."' Id. at
806.
102 47 U.S.C. § 561 (2000).
103 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806-07.
,"4 Id. at 809.
105 47 U.S.C. § 560 (2000).
'06 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 809-10 (quoting section 504 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996).
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restrictive means for the government to achieve its compelling end.'0 7 The Court
theorized that parents wishing to shield their children from the dangers of signal
bleed could and would utilize the government-granted tool of section 504 as a
means of achieving that end. °" In following this line of reasoning, the Court made
clear that it would not simply assume that section 504 would be ineffective"° and
that it particularly would not assume that parents empowered with proper notice of
the availability of section 504 would not act."0 Ultimately, citing both this less
restrictive means issue and the failure of the record to even reflect a serious "signal
bleed" problem to be remedied,"' the Court declared section 505 unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. 1
2
B. Lessons from Playboy
The primary lesson offered by Playboy to those approaching the
constitutionality of COPA is this: when the government's goal is to protect children
from harmful sexual materials conveyed via a certain medium, it may not
accomplish that goal under the First Amendment by using an invasive statutory
regime that chills speech if passing and enforcing legislation that empowers parents
to remedy the problem on their own would serve as less restrictive but equally
efficacious government action capable of protecting children. "'
Applying this lesson directly to COPA, if COPA opponents can show that
Congress could emplace alternative legislation that would empower parents to
remedy the problem of children accessing Internet pornography and that such
legislation would be both less restrictive than COPA and equally or more
efficacious than the regime established by COPA at protecting children, then the
Court should not allow COPA through the gates of the First Amendment." 4
107 Id. at 823-26 ("The Government also failed to prove § 504 with adequate notice would
be an ineffective alternative to § 505.").
108 See id.
109 See id. at 824-25 (expressing doubt as to the validity of the government's "offhand
suggestion" that section 504 would fail due to a lack of parental action and pointing to the
inability of the record to support any such contention).
"o Id. at 824 ("[A] court should not presume parents, given full information, will fail to
act.").
"' Id. at 822-23 ("We agree that the Government has failed to establish a pervasive,
nationwide problem justifying its nationwide daytime speech ban.").
112 Id. at 827.
"3 See id. at 809-10.
"'4 At least one commentator has seen fit to warn against the application of Playboy
principles to the Internet. See Melanie L. Hersh, Note, Is COPPA a Cop Out? The Child
Online Privacy Protection Act as Proof That Parents, Not Government, Should Be
Protecting Children's Interests on the Internet, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1831, 1839-40
(2001) ("It is tempting to analogize the Internet to cable television. However, cable television
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Filtering software comes into play at this point. Filtering software allows the
blocking of particular sites and types of sites." 5 If Congress were to promulgate
legislation that facilitated parental use of these software technologies and if that
legislation were both less restrictive than COPA and at least as efficacious as
COPA, such legislation would be to COPA what section 504 was to section 505 in
Playboy - a less restrictive, equally efficacious avenue of government action
whose very existence mandates the striking down of COPA under the First
Amendment." 6
This approach would address the previously discussed concerns forwarded by
the Third Circuit that parental use of filtering software, in and of itself, does not
constitute government action;1 7 actual government action would play a pivotal role
in any such regime. Further, as will be discussed in detail later, such a regime
would exceed COPA in another constitutional respect: it would redeem the rights
of parents to make decisions regarding the materials to which their children are
exposed.'
is distinguished from the Internet by the limited amount of content that can be broadcast on
its channels, a constraint resulting from the scarcity of broadcast frequencies. The Internet,
by contrast, has unlimited broadcasting potential.").
However, any differences between the media of cable television and the Internet did not
prevent the Third Circuit from relying heavily on the Playboy opinion during its second
COPA analysis. See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 261-66 (3d Cir. 2003) (relying on
Playboy in its least restrictive means analysis). Perhaps the Third Circuit felt comfortable
engaging in this cross-medium analysis because of one thing that the Internet and cable
television have in common: both are media to which the Supreme Court has extended
unqualified First Amendment protection. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)
("[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that
should be applied to [the Internet]."); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639
(1994) ("In light of these fundamental technological differences between broadcast and cable
transmission, application of the more relaxed standard of scrutiny . . . is inapt when
determining the First Amendment validity of cable regulation.") (citation omitted). This
common trait mitigates against the argument that there is danger in analogizing the Internet
and cable television for First Amendment purposes.
Further, the Supreme Court itself might find factual fault with an argument distinguishing
the Internet and cable television on the basis of broadcast potential. As the Court pointed out
in Turner Broadcasting System, "given the rapid advances in fiber optics and digital
compression technology, soon there may be no practical limitation on the number of speakers
who may use the cable medium." Turner, 512 U.S. at 639. If the Supreme Court is correct
in its assessment of the state of cable television, then it is fair to say that an attempt to
distinguish cable television and the Internet based on a difference in broadcasting potential
finds no support in reality.
"1 See infra pp. 267-68.
116 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 810, 827.
".. See supra note 97.
"' See infra pp. 274-75.
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Still, questions remain. What exactly would this legislation look like and
require? Would such legislation be less restrictive than COPA? Would it be at
least equally efficacious in meeting the government's compelling interest? Each of
these questions will be examined in turn.
V. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO COPA
The following proposals by no means exhaust the universe of solutions open to
Congress; indeed, only Congress's collective imagination and the strictures of the
Constitution limit the size of that universe. In light of the fact that the proposals to
come rely heavily upon filtering software, an overview of the functions of such
software programs will first be provided.
A. Filtering Software - A Crash Course
One may install filtering software on an individual computer or on a network
that serves numerous computers." 9 Once installed, filtering software takes action
when a computer user attempts to access a site on the World Wide Web by either
entering a Web address into a Web browsing program or clicking on a link using a
Web browsing program. 2 0 Once triggered, the filtering software program examines
the address the user is attempting to access and compares that address to a list of
"control addresses" that the manufacturer of the software has previously catalogued
and categorized.'2 1 The filtering program checks to see if the entered address has
been categorized; if the address has been categorized, the program checks to see if
the category into which it falls is a category which the user has a right to access per
the parameters set by the software administrator,'22 who, for present discussion
purposes, would likely be a parent or guardian. If the site is one the user is allowed
to access, he or she may visit the site; if not, the filtering program denies the user
access to the site.' In response to the constant expansion of the Internet,
manufacturers of filtering software periodically make updated lists of "control
addresses" available to users; however, this update process generally does not
involve review of sites currently on lists, meaning that, absent a request for review,
a site will remain listed as a "control address," even if the owner of the site removes
all adult materials. 124
"' Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 427-30 (E.D. Pa. 2002),
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As the judiciary has pointed out on several occasions, filtering software is not
perfect, and its use does result in the blocking of some sites that are not
pornographic in nature, but are instead of educational or cultural value, a
phenomenon termed "overblocking."'' 25 On the other hand, the realities of the
Internet, its astronomical rate of growth and constant flux in content, make it
impossible for filtering software companies to create a product that will block each
and every site with adult or pornographic content, resulting in what those in the
field refer to as "underblocking."'1
26
B. Legislation to Sponsor Parental Education on the Availability and Use of
Filtering Software
One COPA alternative open to Congress is legislation supporting
implementation of an educational program for parents on the importance of
monitoring their children while using the Internet, either in person or via use of
filtering software. This statutorily mandated education program could mirror
parental education initiatives in other areas, such as substance abuse,'27 and could
require the FCC to pursue public service announcements on television, on the radio,
in print, and even on the Internet itself.2 8
C. Legislation Requiring Internet Service Providers to Provide Parents with
Information on Filtering Software
Were Congress to desire a more aggressive and invasive approach to the
problem, they might consider enacting legislation requiring Internet service
providers (ISPs) to disseminate information on Internet filtering software to all
customers. 9 A system of civil penalties for failure to comply with the
125 Id. at 437-42 (discussing various studies on the "overblocking" rate of some of the
most popular brands of filtering software and ultimately concluding that six to fifteen percent
of sites blocked by filtering software, if not more, should not be blocked).
126 Id.
127 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 290bb-21(b) (1994 & Supp. 2003) (listing among the duties of the
Director of the Office for Substance Abuse Prevention, the duty to prepare for distribution
documentary films and public service announcements for television and radio to educate the
public about the dangers of alcohol and drug abuse).
128 See id. § 290bb-21(b)(10).
129 At least one state, Texas, has chosen this route, statutorily requiring all ISPs to provide
information on their homepage about filteringfblocking software and a link directing parents
to a download site for such software:
A person who provides an interactive computer service to another person for a
fee shall provide free of charge to each subscriber of the service in this state a
link leading to fully functional shareware, freeware, or demonstration versions
of software or to a service that, for at least one operating system, enables the
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requirements of such a statute would provide the government with a method of
enforcement. 30
D. Creation of a National Database of Commercial Pornographic Websites for
Distribution to Filtering Software Manufacturers
There is yet another tact Congress could take in its efforts to childproof the Net:
Congress could institute a registration requirement for adult websites and could use
registration information to create a database of such sites that could be shared with
filtering software manufacturers. This would aid filtering software makers in
compiling the lists of "control addresses" that power their products. ,31
Congress could delegate the duty of creating and maintaining this database to
the FCC and could grant it the power to require all individuals operating
commercial adult websites to submit an on-line registration form identifying their
Web address or addresses. The FCC could then add addresses to the database. To
make this registration requirement enforceable, Congress could provide for a system
of criminal and/or civil penalties for failure to register. Further, Congress could
empower the FCC to require all suppliers of Web space and accompanying
addresses to disseminate information on the registration requirement to all
individuals to whom they provide these services. Again, the threat of civil and/or
criminal penalties for noncompliance could serve as a method of enforcement.
When drafting the legislation necessary to enable this system, Congress could
draw upon the lessons learned from the treatment of the CDA and COPA by the
judicial system. For example, it would be wise for lawmakers to limit the scope of
the law so that it would only pertain to commercial publications, as Congress did
with COPA. 32 However, it would also be wise for Congress to provide a definition
for the term "commercial" in order to eliminate vagueness within the law. Congress
did not take this step with COPA,'33 and its failure to do so arguably obviated any
subscriber to automatically block or screen material on the Internet.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 35.102 (Vernon 2003).
'30 This is the mode of enforcement that the Texas legislature has chosen to ensure
compliance with section 35.102:
A person is liable to the state for a civil penalty of $2,000 for each day on which
the person provides an interactive computer service for a fee but fails to provide
a link to software or a service as required by Section 35.102. The aggregate civil
penalty may not exceed $60,000.
§ 35.103(a).
Also, the Texas legislature has made clear that no ISP will be held liable for the
effectiveness or reliability of any software or service for which it provides a link. See §
35.102(d).
131 See supra p. 267.
132 See supra notes 32, 35 and accompanying text.
133 See supra note 57.
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ground it might have gained in the eyes of the judiciary when it chose to limit the
scope of the Act to commercial speech in the first place.
Additionally, one improvement cited by courts when comparing COPA to the
CDA was the limitation placed upon the communication media to which COPA
applied.'34 Congress explicitly restricted the scope of COPA to publications on the
Web, thereby excluding e-mail, newsgroups, and other forms of cyber-
communication.'35 Congress would be wise to repeat this restriction when drafting
future legislation.
Finally, it would behoove Congress to choose its words carefully when
delineating the types of sites falling within the scope of the registration requirement.
Admittedly, the Court did not universally applaud the use of the Miller community
standards in COPA to define "material harmful to minors;"'3 6 however, the Court
did decide that inclusion of such standards alone was not enough to support a facial
challenge against COPA, 137 signifying some level of acceptance of the standards by
most members of the Court. Thus, Congress might be well advised to incorporate
the Miller community standards into legislation requiring registration as a way of
delineating the body of Internet sites to which the registration requirement would
apply. An examination of the Courts' reception of the CDA makes one thing clear:
Congress should avoid using undefined, vague terms like "patently offensive."'38
The implementation of a registration requirement and the creation and
maintenance of a database would probably not be a cheap affair; however, there are
several funding possibilities for such an operation. Congress could generate
funding by charging software manufacturers a fee for access to the FCC database. 39
Also, Congress might even go so far as to impose a modest processing fee upon
" See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
'31 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
136 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585-86 (2002).
37 See supra note 54.
138 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
139 Economic incentives for software manufacturers to purchase access to the
government's database would exist. Filtering software manufacturers currently invest a great
deal of resources into amassing their bodies of control addresses. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc.
v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 430-36 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (discussing the arduous
process used by filtering software manufacturers to compile their lists of "control
addresses"), rev'd on other grounds, 71 U.S.L.W. 4465 (U.S. June 23, 2003). Allowing the
government to do that labor for them could possibly result in fiscal savings. Further, the
government's database would pose two additional attractions: due to the mandatory nature
of the registration requirement, any list yielded by that process would likely be more
thorough and complete than any lists compiled by software manufacturers, and use of a
government database might also generate consumer confidence, which would likely yield an
increase in sales.
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those who register their sites; however, such a fee would have to be carefully
limited so as to not create an unacceptable "chilling" effect on speech. 140
E. Less Restrictive?
In order for any of these proposed legislative efforts to provide support for the
arguments of COPA detractors, COPA opponents would have to show the
legislative efforts to be government action less restrictive on speech than COPA.'4 '
As previously mentioned, the primary First Amendment concern with COPA is that
of whether it "chills" speech to a degree intolerable to the First Amendment.'42
Thus, the relevant question would be whether these proposed regimes would have
less of a "chilling" effect on speech than would COPA.
The answer to this question falls in the affirmative where a parental education
initiative is concerned. Legislation resulting in public service announcements
encouraging parents to take a more active role in monitoring their children's
Internet use would certainly do less to discourage would-be Internet speakers than
would COPA. COPA threatens direct criminal prosecution for failure to take
precautions which, for many, would probably be unbearably expensive'43 and
requires Internet publishers to collect personal information on users, a practice with
the potential to discourage both access of and publication of speech.' 44 An
educational initiative, unlike COPA, would not burden publishers; if it placed a
burden on anyone, it would be the government agency charged with the duty of
implementing it or the parents subjected to it.
Further, an educational initiative would cast parents as the primary actors in the
process of protecting children from harmful materials on the Internet. As the Third
Circuit recently pointed out, use of filtering software in the home is a voluntary
matter and is a decision to be made by the parent.'45 Thus, any filtering or blocking
of speech that actually took place would be directly traceable to a voluntary
decision made by the parent, which would drastically minimize the accountability
of the government for any squelching of speech.
"4 See supra pp. 265-66 and note 85.
141 See supra pp. 265-66 and note 85.
14' See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
143 See supra note 28.
4 See supra note 73.
143 See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 264 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[H]ere we only consider
the voluntary use of [filtering and blocking] software by parents who have chosen to use this
means to protect their children.") (distinguishing Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F.
Supp. 2d 401, 410 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding state-compelled, mandatory use of filtering
software by library patrons to violate the First Amendment), rev'd on other grounds, 71
U.S.L.W. 4465 (U.S. June 23, 2003)).
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As for legislation requiring ISPs to disseminate information on filtering
software, such a provision would be analogous to section 504 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 146 to which the Supreme Court gave its stamp of
approval in Playboy,147 in that it would place the burden on the service provider to
enable parents to take action to protect their children. Also, the dangers of
noncompliance would rest with ISPs and not with Internet speakers, making it
unlikely that such legislation would result in any sort of "chilling" of speech.
Finally, with regard to creation of an adult website database and institution of
a mandatory registration requirement, it is arguable that the registration requirement
would spawn a certain level of "chilling" effect on speech due to the fact that its
institution would require publishers of adult materials to take extra precautions not
required of publishers of most other sorts of materials. However, the question to
be answered is whether such a regime would be less restrictive than COPA.
Even if Congress chose to implement a system of criminal and civil penalties
for noncompliance with the registration requirement and to authorize the assessment
of a modest fee, a registration requirement would still differ from COPA in one key
respect: unlike COPA, a registration requirement would not be so financially
burdensome as to discourage publication. 4 '
F. Equally Efficacious?
Having established that the Court would likely find any or all of the proposed
COPA alternatives to be less restrictive, the question of whether the alternatives
would be as capable of achieving the government's goal of protecting children as
would COPA (i.e., whether the proposed methods would be equally efficacious)
"4 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 504, 47 U.S.C. § 560 (2003) (requiring cable
television providers to "fully scramble or otherwise fully block" any channel upon customer
request free of charge).
147 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816-26 (2000)
(striking down a provision on least-restrictive-means grounds due to the availability of
section 504 as a less restrictive alternative open to the government).
148 Some might argue that a registration requirement would chill speech by requiring the
submission of personal information to the government, a requirement that some publishers
could find undesirable to the point of discouragement due to the fear of having their identities
or personal information associated with an adult website. However, it would not be entirely
necessary to require submission of personal information as part of the registration process.
Congress and/or the FCC could simply require submission of information sufficient to
identify and tag the relevant website. Collection of personal information could be saved for
the enforcement stage of the process, during which personal information could be sought and
collected but only in an effort to identify the owner of a website found to have not been
properly registered. Under such a system, one who fully complied with the law could rest
assured that personal information would not be collected by the government and associated
with an adult website, obviating any speech-chilling concerns.
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remains. Of extreme relevance to this inquiry is the recent holding by the Third
Circuit that use of filtering software alone, without the benefit of any of the
aforementioned legislative schemes, represents a solution that is just as effective as
COPA. 149 The Third Circuit based this holding, in part, on the fact that filtering
software is capable of reaching the following classes of potentially harmful
materials which fall outside of the scope of COPA: material published on foreign
websites, materials on noncommercial websites, and materials published on non-
"http" protocols. 5 Logic suggests that if the use of filtering software alone is as
effective as COPA, then use of filtering software, coupled with any or all of the
proposed legislative efforts, each of which stands only to make use of filtering
software even more effective, would represent a solution to the problem that is
definitely as effective or more effective than COPA.
The argument that filtering software is less effective than COPA because of its
reliance on parental action in order to succeed still exists. 5 ' The logical extension
of this argument is that government intervention in the form of COPA would be
more effective because the government would be duty bound to enforce the Act,
whereas parents could freely choose not to use filtering software, thereby leaving
their children at risk and unprotected.'52
The government offered this argument to the Third Circuit, but the court did not
budge on its holding that filtering software represents an equally efficacious
alternative.'53 Opposing the government's argument, the court cited Playboy, in
which the Supreme Court stated the following: "[A] court should not presume
parents, given full information, will fail to act.""l5 Thus, just as the Supreme Court
refused to assume that parents would not request the cable company to fully
scramble adult channels in Playboy, when examining the question of whether
government facilitation of filtering software use is an equally efficacious alternative
to COPA, the Court should not assume that parents will not use filtering software.
Implementation of any of the proffered legislative alternatives or any
combination of them would likely have the result of increasing the efficacy of
149 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. As mentioned earlier, see supra note 97,
there is the argument that the Third Circuit committed error with this holding because
parental use of filtering software is not government action and cannot, therefore, foil the
constitutionality of COPA. Assuming that error was committed (it is the position of this Note
that it was), the Third Circuit's analysis of the effectiveness of filtering software remains
intact and untainted by the error because the question of whether parental use of filtering
software constitutes government action has no bearing on the court's evaluation of the
efficacy of filtering software as compared to COPA.
15 See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 262.
'.' See id. at 262-64.
152 See id.
'5 See id.
' Id. at 262 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 805
(2000)).
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filtering software, either by encouraging more widespread use of filtering software
or by making individual use of filtering software more thorough. If use of filtering
software alone is as efficacious as COPA for the reasons cited by the Third
Circuit, I5 then it logically follows that an approach to the problem that incorporates
use of filtering software with any one or combination of the proposed legislative
alternatives, each of which would likely serve to augment the effectiveness of
filtering software, would represent an approach even more efficacious than COPA,
mitigating against the constitutionality of COPA.
VI. COPA AND PARENTAL RIGHTS - THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
ARGUMENT AGAINST COPA
The overwhelming majority of the debate surrounding COPA and, indeed, the
overwhelming majority of this Note has focused on whether COPA comports with
the First Amendment. However, there is another viable avenue of attacking
COPA's constitutionality, namely the argument that COPA violates the due process
rights of parents. COPA's transgression of this constitutional right provides an
additional reason for the courts to declare COPA unconstitutional and instead to opt
for one of the legislative alternatives offered, which leave room for and defer to the
exercise of parental discretion. Also, as stated earlier, the Court has recently hinted
that it might find COPA's language to be sufficiently narrowly tailored upon a full
review.'56 This provides an impetus to push any available alternative arguments in
order to regain any ground lost by COPA opponents, including this particular
argument.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the right of a parent to make certain
childrearing decisions, a right that the Court has placed under the heading of
substantive due process.'57 The contexts in which this right has been recognized in
the past include the following: the right of parents to enroll their children in private
schools, as opposed to public schools; 5  the right of parents to engage a teacher to
educate their child in the German language;' 59 and the right of parents to make
's See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
116 See supra pp. 254-55..
' See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (encapsulating the right
with the following words: "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control"); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in
the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition.").
158 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-36.
'59 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923).
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decisions concerning child visitation by grandparents.'6 ° Perhaps even more
relevant to COPA is the fact that the Supreme Court pointed to interference with the
rights of parents to exercise discretion over the material to which their children are
exposed as a factor recommending against the constitutionality of the CDA in Reno
v. ACLU.1
6 1
COPA interferes with parents' due process rights by attacking speech at the
source, rather than at the receiving end.'62 By taking this approach, COPA
eliminates any opportunity a parent might have to decide for himself or herself
whether certain material or classes of material are unsuitable for his or her own
children. 163 The filtering software at the center of each of the proposed alternatives,
on the other hand, leaves control in the hands of parents, who are free to decide
whether to install the software at all and who have the opportunity to configure
filtering software in a manner that allows certain categories of materials while
blocking others.'64
In light of the history of recognition for the rights of parents to make
childrearing decisions and in light of the availability of legislative alternatives
which, unlike COPA, leave that right intact, the Court should cite the violation of
parents' substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments66 as an additional, buttressing reason for striking down COPA.
VHI. CONCLUSION
The Internet has already and will continue to pose a legion of new challenges
for courts and legislatures, who must work toward innovative ways of monitoring
and policing this new frontier, while also encouraging its growth and safeguarding
the rights of citizen users. Of all the steps Congress might take to try to keep pace
with the growth and development of the Net, taking shortcuts that tread on the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the citizenry should not be one. COPA, like
the CDA before it, is simply an impermissible shortcut. The Court might be
impressed with Congress's effort and marked improvement, but when reviewing
COPA, the Court must remember that the central question remains that of whether
there are other ways of accomplishing the task at hand that will work just as well,
"6o See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-74 (2000).
161 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 865 (1997) ("Under the CDA ... neither the
parents' consent - nor even their participation - in the communication would avoid the
application of the statute.").
162 See id.
163 See id.
"64 See supra pp. 267-68 and notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
165 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law...."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ).
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but that will do less harm to speech and substantive due process rights. Where
COPA is concerned, there are many viable alternatives, and, in light of past
precedent, this reality should seal COPA's fate in the eyes of the Court.
Shaun Richardson
